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',85~8 , BRAY',V;. JONES," [20C.(~d) 
~; l .)1 
,., [L. A. No; '17798. ; In Bank. '\. Sept. 29, 1942.]" : 1:(, 
,I'} i 'i' " ' .. "" 
W.~.l3RAY,et'at"Respondents, v, IDA T;,JONES, Appelllint. 
j;,f" <:. 
Lll Taxation,,:,;,;,;Sale-:...By State-:-Without Deed: to State-:;.N6tice' ;~t 
Sale.,......;Anotice, of, tax" sale coIiformed to' Pol. ' Code; '§§ 3764, 
,. 3765,: as they stood in 1930, where it set forth the name' of the 
, person whose property was assessed, a description of thepro~ 
erty; and an amount equal to the total amount of allta'xe8j 
assllssments, penhlties~ and costs due,' and where it 'provided 
that the property ,would be sold unless the taxes delinquent, 
together with interest and penalties Were paid, sincll the ref-
erence to "taxes" costs and, percentages" did not suggest that 
the penalties were excluded.' , 
[2] Id . ...;..Enforcement-::;Law Governing. - A delinquent tax list 
which is formulated and whose first publication precedes the 
effective date of an urgency measure amending the statute is 
,not governed by the amendment, although remaining pl,lblica-
'tions follow the effective date. Hence p:roceedings leading to 
a tax deed are not invalidated by the failure to inclUde in the 
notice in the addenda to the delinquent .list for 1935 a reference 
to Pol. Code, § 3817c3, ,~s prescribe<i by Pol. Code, § 38i7d, as 
amended in 1935, where the' amendment became effective after 
the :firs~ publication; " 
[3] Id.-Sale,-Law Governing.-Under Pol. Code, § 381'7, as it 
stood prior to the adoption of the Rev. & Tax. Code, there was 
no privilege of redemption after sale of property to the state 
for delinquent taxes unless the state chose not to sell. Hence, 
although by an amendment to the tax law (Pol. Code, § 3817d, 
as amended in 1935) the state elected not to sell property 
sold to it for taxes prior to ,a given date, a sale and tax deed 
pursuant to a later amendment permitting the sale (Pol. Code, 
§ 3817d,as amended in 1937) was valid. 
[4] Id.-Sale-Law Governing.-The Legislature has full control 
over the sale of property belonging to the state, and may at any 
time regulate the method of its disposition. A sale by the 
state of property sold to it for delinquent taxes is governed by 
the law as it stands at the time of the sale by the state. , 
~5],Id.-Sale-BY State,-Notice of Sale-Instruction to ",p'ostal 
Authorities.-A tax collector giving notice of tax, sale ,to the 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Taxation, § 318(1); [2J Tax~tion, 
§220j [3,4] ,Taxation, § 300; [6lTaxation, § 215(5). 
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';fb~er' o~ner waS not requited by former phI:: Cocl~,§; 3m~ 
"'''to' :instruct the postal authorities 'to' hold' the 'nofiil~fOr '!21 
, " :days where there was no instruction on the envelolni tiuit it 
be returned to the collector within a certain 'nlimber' of days; 
(Contrary language in Numitof' GoZd Mining 00. V. Katller, '83 
. Cal. App', 161, 256 Pac. 464, disapproved.)' '. i '. 1 ' 
[6] Id.-Levj':"';'Validity.-A tax levycallmg fQr::an~ount ni 
excess o:l!'the amount budgeted for a school district' was vl1lid 
\"heretheexcess was less than' 10 per cent of 'the itcmbudgete'd 
'8:ndwaS thus a 'reasonable allowance for tax ; 'delinquency 
within former Pol. Code, § 3714, subd. 5. ' . 
,.: ,i:J'") .: ._ .' 
, APPEAJ;;froJIl a jup.gment of the Superior Court of Kern. 
<IOl;mty.Willhtm L. B~adshaw, Judge. Affirmed. 
, , 
Action'to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
R:i:p~ael' Dechter, and Lyman P. Robertson t,or Appellant. : ':: 
M. J. Hankin, Milo V. Olson, R.Leslie Sparks,' John O. Pal. 
stine 'and ,Herbert C. Kelly; as Amici Curiae; on behalf of 
Appellant: " 
West & Vizzard and Edw. West for Respondents.; 
, : Earl Warren, Att~rney General, and H. H: Lmriey', AsSist- , 
lint Attorney' General, as Amici Curiae, on 'behalf of Re: 
spondents. 
THAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, as holders of a tax deed,brou.ght 
this action to quiet title to real property against the defend-
ant, the former owner. The property was soldto the state On 
June 30, 1930, for non-payment of taxes for the year 1929. 
Five years elapsed without redemption and; on July 15,1935, 
the county tax collector executed his deed to the state.There-
after the property was sold at public' auction, and the deed 
of the county tax collector, dated October 19, 1937, was exe-
cuted to the plaintiffs. Defendant appeals from the judgment 
quieting title to the property. She contends that the sever81, 
proceedings leading to the sale to the state in 1930, the 
deed to the state in 1935, and the deed to the plaintiff in 1937, 
were void. 
, [1] The asserted invalidity of the proceedingS leading to 
the sale to the state on June 30, 1930, is attributed to an 
alleged failure of the notice of sale to comply with section 
\ 
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3764 of the Political Code, which at that time provided that 
the delinquent notice should contain: "the names of persons 
and a description of the property delinquent, and an amount 
equal to the total amount of all taxes, aSsessments, penalties, 
and costs due, and which are a lien thereon." 
The preliminary paragraph of the notice of sale, published 
in the Bakersfield Californian in June of 1930, read as follows: 
"DEFAULT HAVING BEEN MADE in the payment of taxes 
levied in the year 1929 for the County of Kern, for the year 
ending June 30,1930, upon the real and personal property 
described in the DELINQUENT LIST hereto appended: 
"Now, THEREFORE, I, C. E. DAY, Tax Collector in and for 
the said County of Kern, by virtue of authority in me vested, 
hereby give public notice that unless the taxes delinquent as 
appear in said list, together with penalties and costs, are 
paid on or before the sale date given below, the real estate 
upon which taxes are a lien, will By OPERATION OF LAW be 
sold 'TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, on Monday the 30th of 
June, 1930, at 12 o'clock M.(except any lot, place or parcel 
on said list which has heretofore been sold to the State)." 
The delinquent list sets forth under the heading "Paleto": 
"Jones, John T., rec. No. 13895, W lh of SW 1,4 of SE lA, 
Sec. 2, TWp. 11, R. 23, $4;73." At page 12, the list states: "All 
figures in the foregoing list relating to taxes, percentages and 
costs, represent dollars, except the two right hand figures in 
each item whlch represent cents." 
The list contains the name of the person whose property is 
assessed and a description of the property, as required by 
Political Code, section 3764. The description is followed by 
the figure $4.73. Since presumably public officials follow the 
law and perform their duties properly, it must be assumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the figure 
$4.73represented the total amount of taxes, assessments, pen-
alties and costs delinquent. (Pol. pode, §§ 3897 (7) and 3786; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1963 (15).) The defendant made no at-
tempt to prove that the amount set opposite the description 
does not correctly represent that total, but relies on an alleged 
defect in the preliminary statement that "Unless the taxes 
delinquent as appear in said list, together with penalties and 
costs, are paid .. ." the property will be ,sold to the state. 
Defendant contends that this statement made the notice void 
because it did not specifically state that penalties and costs 
were included in the list but stated'in effect that taxes only 
Sept. 1942] BRAY v. JONES 
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were included and that the owner of the property would be 
compelled to pay, in addition to the amount of the taxes 
shown on the list, a sum representing penalties and costs in 
order to redeem the property and prevent the sale. The list 
must of course include the total of the taxes, costs, and pen-
alties, but there is no requirement that the notice state that' 
it does so. The statement, added by the tax collector pursuant 
to the mandate of Political Code, section 3765, is phrased in 
substantially the language of that section: "The tax collector 
must append and publish with the delinque'nt list a notice 
that unless the taxes delinquent, together with the costs and 
penalties, are paid, the real property upon which such taxes 
are a lien will be sold." When, as in this case,' the notice sets 
forth the name of the person whose property is' assessed, a 
description of the property, and "an amount equal to the, 
total amount of all taxes, assessments, penalties, and costs, 
due," and provides that the property will be sold unless the, 
taxes delinquent, together with interest and penalties are paid, 
the notice conforms to the requirements of' Political Code, 
sections 3764 and 3765. 
Defendant relies on several cases holding notices 'invalid 
because of non-compliance with section ,3764 .. , (Bussenius y. 
Warden,71 Cal. App. 717 [236 Pac. 371] LKnoke v. Knight, 
' . ~'., f. ". '! . 
206 Cal. 225 [273 Pac. 786]; Fleishman v. Davis, 128 Cal" 
App.174 [16 P. (2d) 776] ; Redman v. New~Zl~1l4 Oal. App. 
215 [299 Pac. 746] ; Rexonv. Gaffey, 119 91ll.App. '389 [6 I\ 
(2d) 534] ; Snodgrass v.Errengy, 86 Cal. App.664 [261 Pac.' 
497] ; Jones v. Walker, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 566 [118 P. (2d) 
299] .) None of these cases is controlling here. In the leading 
case of Bussenius v. Warden, supra, upon which the others 
are based, the court expressly recognized that pJ;'elimlliary 
statements phrased like the one in the p1-esentcase .wereap-
pended to meet the requirements of P6litieai Cod.e, section,: 
3765. What the courts took' exception to was the statement 
in the notices that the lists contained only taxes and costs. 
In Bussenius v. Warden, supra, for example, there :was a, 
statement in the notice that " ... the figures appearing op-
posite each description, were intended to. and do represent 
respectively in dollars or in cents, as the case may be, the 
amount due for taxes, and costs." Similar b'tatements were 
contained in the notices in Knoke v. Knight, supra; FleiShman 
v. Davis, supra; Redman v. Newell, supra; Snodgrass v. Err-
engy, supra, and Jones v. Walker, supra. The figures, expressly 
.. 
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set fo,rth as taxes and cos.ts, were clearly exclusive o,f,penalties. 
Iil the pl,'es~nt case; hQwe~er~ the statement With'tespect,tQthe 
figures re.fers to, taxes,' percentages and CQsts, not to, iSQlate 
penalties therefrQm;' but merely to, specify that they ~re fepre-
sented by figures d~noting' dQllars and cents.. The statement 
SUggestS the inclusion rather thim the, exclusiQn Qf penalties, 
for the statutes fQrmerly used "percentage" in place Qf "pen-
alties." BefQre 1895, PQlitical CQde, sectiQn ,3765 required the 
tax cQllector' to append and publish with the tax list a nQtice 
that llliless the 'deLinquent taxes, together with CQs:ts Ilnd pf;lr-
centagewere paid, the pro,perty WQuid be's6ld at publi~ a1i~. 
tiQn. In 1895, the LegislatUre adQpted an amendment replacing 
'''p'ercentage'' with "penalty" to, deno,tethe percentage that 
was added as penalty~ Th~ new term, was .chQsen, nQt tq in-
augurate a new cQncept but to, lend, greaterprecisio,n, to, the' 
Qld. It was medill the preliminary statem,ent in, thepres¢rit 
case as required by sectio,n 3765. The questiQn here is nQt 
whether the cQllecto,r was required to, use "penalties" and nQt 
"percentages," hut whether a declaratio,n that penalties were 
excluded fro,m the list shQuldbe read into, a statement' that 
certain figures represent dQllars and cents. Only if the statute 
had required that the' 'penalty" be set fQrth as a separate 
item, WQuid it be viQlated by a failure to do, so, Qr by the set-
ting fo,rth Qf the item as "percentage." (Gottstein v. Kelly, 
206 Cal. 742 [276 Pac. 347].) In the absence Qf ,such a re-
quirement, hQwever, it Wo,uld be unreaso,nable to, read the 
exclusiQn o,f penalties into, the tax co,llecto,r's reference, to 
"taxes, CQsts and percentages." 
In any event the cases relied UPo,n by the defendant were 
concerned with sectiQn 3764 when, as interpreted by,Gottstein 
v. Kelly, supra, it required taxes, assessments, penalties, and 
CQsts to, be separately stated. '1'he failure to, set fQrth the 
amo,unt due fo,r penalties, emphasized by the statements in 
the no,tices that, penalties were no,t included, was plainly in 
vio,latio,n Qf the statute as it then read. Immediately after the 
decisio,n in Gottstein'v. Kelly, supra, ho,wever, the Legislature ' 
amended sectio,n 3764 to, make clear that taxes, assessments, 
penalties and costs were no,t to, be set, fo,rth separately, but 
were to, be included in a single to,tal amo,unt. It is with the 
amended sectio,n that the present case is co,ncerned. Cases 
ho,lding no,tices invalid fo,r nQt meeting certain requirements 
can have no, applicatio,n to, nQtices that must meet new re-
quirements incQnsistent with the Qld. 
~ 
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.' ,[2] Th~,~ssertedinvalidity of the p'roceedhigs 'l~adingt~ 
th,e deed to the state Qn July 15, 1935, 'is at~i-iblitedtQ,the ' 
failure o,f the tax cQllectQr to, include a reference. to PQHtical ' 
C6desectio,n. 3817 (c) (3) in the no,tice in the addeiida to, ,th~ 
,d,elin,qu,ent)'ist fQr 1935, as prescribed by Politicaj'C()de ,s~e. 
tiQns,3764 and 3817,(d), as amended in 1935. "," ,;. 
,;SectiQn 376;lprQvides that "On Qr befQre the ,eighth ,day 
6'£' June' Qf each year, the tax cQllecto,r ,shail,pubUsJithe, de,. 
. ( i (, , . . . '. . I' .'.;';. '. " ~ t 
linquent list .... " SectiQn 3766 prQvides that Itthe,'publica~ 
,ttonmust be)made' once a week fQr three sUccessrve,'Weeks:. 
::'. ;,', , The'list in questio,n in the present case was first' pub~ 
-1 f ' " , . -. ..' "".. J •• : ! 
l.~shea'_ Qn 'June 6, 1935, in accQrdance with ,the statut~ry 
r¢qu:il'e~ents then prevailing. On June 11, 1935, fivEl days 
after the first publicatio,n, the act adding sectio,n 3817(c) (3) 
to the PQlitical Co,de and amending sectiQn 3817(d) became 
'eff~ctive as an urgency measure~ (Stats. 1935, p. 1061.) That 
l;tci required'tl;tat th~ no,tice fo,r1:he years 1935, 1936, and 1937 
refer to, the new sectio,n3817 (c) (3), which was nQt i;n, effect 
Qn,Jtine 6, 1935, and was therefQre nQt mentioned in the 
pUblishep. no,tice. '. ' " 
' ,On June ~, 1935, the Co,ntents and fQrm o,f the listwer~ 
gQverned by 'the law then in effect. The list was made up hi 
'cdrifoi'Illity with that law and published thereunder, . arid 
became the delinquent list fo,r 1935. Smce the fQrmulatiQn 
Qf the list and its.first publicatiQn preceded the, effective da~ 
of the 1935ameridment, its CQntents and fQrm did nQt CQme 
'W,ithi~the purvieW' Qf that amendment merely because i~ 
twosucdessive publicatio,ns fQllQwed that effective date. Sec~ 
tiQn 3766 requires republicatio,n Qf the list in the form that-
sectiQn 3764 prescribed at the time Qf tlie ~stpublicatiQn of 
the list. PrecisiQn ,wo,uld be endangered and consistency. ~ dar 
strQyed under a rule that required deViationsfrQm the 6rig~ 
inal'list whenever the sequence Qf its publicatiQns fell withiD. 
the perio,d o,f statutQry changes. SectiQn 3766 contemplated 
ndt'successive lists, but successive publicatio,ns o,f the same 
list. There are, mo,reo,ver, practical Qbstacles to, the prep~ra~ 
tiQn Qf, delinquent lists. They require time and painstaking 
~axe, and it WQuid be unreaso,nable to, expect the tax CQllectQr 
to prepare new lists in the shQrt interval between thb required 
times fQr publicatiQn. 
, [3] Defendant's co,ntentiQn that the tax 'deed issued to 
plaintiff was VQid because sectiQn 3817(d) as amended in 
1935, pro,hibited a sale by the state to, private individualS 
i 
I:' 
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before January 1, 1938, is without merit in view of the 1937 
amendment specifically excepting property sold to the state 
in the year 1930 or earlier years. Defendant errs in contend-
ing that she had a vested right to redeem the property after 
its sale to the state, for under Political Code section 3817 
there has never been a privilege of redemption after sale to 
the state unless the state chooses not to sell the property. 
The 1935 amendment was simply an election not to sell the 
property, while the 1937 amendment was an election to per-
mit its sale. Any temporary limitation that the state placed. 
upon its own freedom to sell in no way diminished the limita-
tion on defendant's privilege of redemption. The state is 
free to terminate the privilege of the former owner to redeem 
by fixing the time when it will dispose of the property. 
[4] "The Legislature has full control over the sale of prop-
erty belonging to the state, which it may direct sold,and to 
regulate or change at any time the method of its disposition." 
(Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226, 233 [121 Pac. 924] ; see, also, 
Baird v. Monroe, 150 Cal. 560, 567 [89 Pac. 352] ; Young v. 
Patterson, 9 Cal. App. 469, 471 [99 Pac. 552].) For the 
same reasons there is no merit in the contention of amicus 
curiae that Political Code section 3897, as it read' in 1929 
rather than as in 1935, governed the sale made to the pur-
chaser in 1937. The case of Anglo-California National Bank 
v. Leland, 9 Cal. (2d) 347 [70 P. (2d) 937], cited by defen-
dant, holds only that the general rule governing sales to indi-
viduals does not prevent the state from extending the period 
of redemption where it holds the title to tax deeded land as 
it did in section 3817 (c) (4) of the Political Code. 
[5] Defendant contends that the tax collector erred in 
. failing to instruct the United States postal authorities to 
hold for twenty-one days the notice of the 1935 sale mailed' 
to the defendant pursuant to Political Code section '3771(a). 
The record proves, however, that the tax collector complied 
exactly with that section, and was not required thereunder 
to make such an instruction. There was no instruction on 
the envelope that· it be retu~ned to the tax collector within 
a certain number of days, as there was in Joslin v. Shaffer, 
66 Cal. App. 69 [225 Pac. 307], and Healton v. Morrison, 162 
Cal. 668 [124 Pac~ 240], cited by defendant. The statement 
in Numitor Gold Mining Co. v. Katzer, 83 Cal. App. 161 
[256 Pac. 464], that the collector must give such an instruc-
tion disregarded the fact that it is not required by . the 
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statute. This statement was not necessary to the decision in 
that case and is disapproved. 
[6] There is no merit in the contention that the tax levy 
was void because it called for an amount in excess by $925.61 
of the $10,000 budgeted for a certain school district. The 
excess, which was less than 10 per cent of the item budgeted, 
was a reasonable allowance for tax delinquency. (Pol. Code, 
§ 3714(5); Ryan v. Byram, 4 Cal. (2d) 596 [51 P. (2d) 
872] ; Otis v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. (2d) 366 [70 
,Po (2d) 633].) 
An examination of the record discloses that the delin-
quent list for 1935 was published in the body of a newspaper 
and not in a sU"pplement, as contended by defendant. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., 
and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 26, 
1942. 
[L. A. No. 17904. In Bank. Sept. 29, 1942.] 
ROSANNA BILA, Respondent, V. ARCHIBALD B. 
YOUNG et aI., Appellants. 
'[1] Old Age SecuritY-Mandamus-Petition.-A petition for 4 
writ -of mandate to compel the Social Welfare Board to award 
old age security payments states a cause of action entitling 
the court to examine the action of the board in dismissing i lin 
appeal thereto, where it alleges that the board· acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in that it· made the g:J:"anting of 
security to the petitioner contingent upon securing a lite 
estate in property of which she was not the owner, a,ndthat 
such contingency was not then and is not now a requirement' 
under the act. . . 
[2] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Mand,amus. - Where 
the action of an administrative board·. involves construction of 
the statute under which it functions, a question of law is pre-
sented which may be reviewed upon mandate. 
[3a, 3b] Old .Age Security-Persons Entitled.-An applicant for 
[3] Old age assistance benefits, note, 101 A. L. R. 1215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5] Old AgeSecuritYi [2] Admin" 
,istrative Law j [4] Evidence, § 43. 
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